

Spring 2012

Tu Th 9:20 – 10:35

MG 105

IR 334-010 –Prospects for Peace in the 21st Century – Chaim Kaufmann

4 credit hours (CRN: 16752) – revised 3/16/2012

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Name: IR-334-010-SP12

Office hours (200 Maginnes): Tu Th 10:45-12:00, or by appointment

Course Objective:

This course's first objective is to develop skills to design and—especially—to evaluate social science research. We will consider and evaluate important recent work in I.R. Class members will also produce substantial research projects on questions of your choice.

Our second objective is substantive: What do we know about the prospects that the 21st century will be more peaceful (or less peaceful) than the 'Terrible 20th' that saw the two World Wars, the Cold War and the threat of nuclear devastation, ethnic and ideological civil wars and genocides, and the rise of international terrorism.

One encouraging feature of the Terrible 20th is that its second half turned out to be a 'Long Peace.' Since August 14, 1945, no two major powers have gone to war with each other—a record for the modern states system. Can the 'Long Peace' continue?

The issues divide into two main themes. First, how much do we know about the causes of war and peace—what factors determined the Terrible Twentieth and the Long Peace? While many questions remain unsettled, systematic study of the history of the last several centuries has yielded important insights and at least some generalizations that hold up fairly well across time and space—although, on balance, we still have more questions than answers.

Second, how will the prospects for peace in the first half of the 21st century be affected by the two main changes that have occurred in the international security environment since the end of the Cold War?

The first is that the United States has become a sole superpower with—even after 2008—a greater strength advantage over rivals than any state has had for many centuries. This power asymmetry could improve prospects for peace by allowing the United States to suppress regional aggressors and promote democracy and human rights. Or will American efforts to extend its global military and economic reach provoke counter-balancing by China or others and higher, not lower, international tensions? (Many trees have been killed by research on these issues, but there is much less resolved than there are open opportunities for you.)

The other is that non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have become a much more important force in world politics than a few decades ago. Some, such as humanitarian relief, human rights, and peace advocacy organizations, operate as forces for reducing violent conflict, or at least for ameliorating its consequences. Others, such as terrorists, have become much more capable of inflicting harm than they were and, sometimes, of preventing peaceful settlement of conflicts. Relatively little is known about the likely impact of these factors, but they can be studied using our knowledge of their impact so far and of analogous developments that have occurred before. (Here are many, many more opportunities for class research projects.)

Course Outline:

- I. Designing Social Science Research Projects
- II. Political Psychology: Effects on Assessment and Policy Choice
- III. Collective Action, Climate, and Other Problems

Prerequisites:

- IR 10 (Introduction to International Relations).
- Good background in the diplomatic history of one or more major regions of the world.
- If you have not completed IR 105 (Theories of International Politics), see me.

Curriculum:

This course counts as one of two 300-level research seminars required for the major in International Relations (or as 4 credits toward the 44 for the major; your choice).

It also satisfies the College of Arts and Sciences writing intensive (W.I.) requirement.

Requirements:

1. All students are expected to be fully prepared for each class session. Readings average about 65 pages per day for the roughly 20 sessions that have assigned readings, although they vary widely from day to day. Readings assigned for each meeting are due before that meeting (this is necessary for the daily essays anyway).

2. Prior to each class meeting that has assigned readings, write a one page essay analyzing a theoretical, methodological, or policy issue that seems to you to be raised by the readings. See "Instructions for IR 334 Daily Essays" on our CourseSite under 'Assignments.'

Essays will be graded on a simple OK/not OK basis, worth either 1% or 0 towards your final course grade. Although there are about 20 sessions for which you can write daily essays, only 15 are required. Extra essays count 1% additional toward your final grade.

In addition to submission to me, you must submit a daily essay of your choice to our TRAC Fellow by February 7.

3. I not only encourage but expect students to participate energetically. Your comments and questions are part of your responsibility to educate not only yourself but also your colleagues and me. This does not mean that anyone should seek to consume all the oxygen in the room; the standard to meet is at least one intervention daily that could not have been made by an unprepared person.

For people who may be shy about speaking in public, I recommend any of three remedies: First, recognize that at least half of your colleagues are also shy and are will appreciate your speaking first. Nothing actually harmful can happen to you. Even if other students or I disagree with some of your remarks, that would not mean that you were foolish to raise the issue. Rather, you will have gained information about what others think.

Second, try preparing in advance questions, comments, or even short speeches based on the reading; then bring these up during class. If no obvious opportunity presents itself, just make one—I will normally entertain "off topic" comments or questions.

Third, if you simply cannot face speaking in front of the whole class, engage me at the end of class and raise your questions then.

Decorum: No phones or texting. More generally, do not distract anyone.

4. A substantial research project (see "IR 334 Main Paper Assignment" under 'Assignments') that seeks to resolve some question that has implications for the prospects for peace—either globally or in some region—during the first half of the 21st century. In order to allow you to build the skills you will need in manageable chunks, the project will be done in seven stages:

*A research tools assignment, due January 31;

*Proposal, due February 7;

*Literature review, due February 28;

*Test design, due March 27;

*First draft of the complete paper, due April 19;

*Critique of a colleague's draft, due on or about April 30 (this uncertainty will be resolved as we get closer to the date); and

*Revised final paper, due on the last day of exam period (May 9).

As a Writing Intensive Course, writing assignments total about 55 pages; I say 'about' because most assignments have maximum lengths, not minimums. This includes daily essays, proposal, literature review, and first draft, but not research tools (which is not really a writing task) or your final revision. (There is also some double counting, as parts of intermediate assignments will likely survive into the final paper.)

Grading:

Daily essays 15%

Seminar 20%

Research project (all parts must be completed to pass):

Research tools 2%

Proposal 5%

Literature review 10%

Test design 10%

Complete first draft 10%

Critique of colleague's draft 10%

Final paper 20%

Total 102%

Extra credit opportunities:

As mentioned, daily essays beyond the minimum count.

If you attend a non-course lecture and discussion (at Lehigh or elsewhere) on a topic related to this course, you may submit a reaction paper worth 1% of the final course grade. A document on our CourseSite under 'Assignments' provides instructions.

You will also find there an extra credit assignment that allows you to contribute to improving Lehigh's library holdings.

There is a semester limit of 10% on XC assignments.

Submission of Assignments:

All submissions to me must be on paper, not electronic. 12 point type, double spacing, 1" margins, page numbers.

Assignments are normally due at the start of class. The first five research assignments, if submitted late, will be assessed a penalty of 1% of the final course grade per day. You will still receive feedback, but not necessarily as promptly as colleagues who submitted on time. The only permissible exceptions are medical or family emergencies certified by Dean of Students Susan Lantz (she will send an e-mail to all your instructors stating that make-up privileges are appropriate.) Printer trouble is not a valid reason for an extension.

The sixth assignment (critique) must be submitted on time.

The final paper is an exception: anyone who wishes may take an incomplete (“NF”) for the course (of course, not practical for seniors graduating this semester). Once the paper is submitted, I will grade it at my convenience.

Message from our TRAC Fellow:

My name is Jingchao Wu (jiw212@Lehigh.EDU). I will be the TRAC fellow for IR 334 this Spring, and I will assist you with any issues related to your writing process. Over the course of the semester, feel free to contact me with any questions about writing. In addition, you will submit parts of your written work to me three times: the 3rd assignment (literature review), 4th (test design), and 5th (first draft), each nine days before they are due to Professor Kaufmann. I will provide you with written comments and then meet with you in individual conferences:

Literature review: due February 19, conferences February 20-22.

Test design: due March 18, conferences March 19-21.

First draft: due April 10, conferences April 11-13.

Please identify the specific documentation styles you are using.

Note from instructor: These processes are **mandatory**; assignments cannot be submitted to me if not completed.

Intellectual Integrity:

The Department of International Relations Policy on Academic Integrity and Plagiarism is hereby incorporated into this syllabus (a copy may be found under ‘Assignments’). See also the relevant pages of your Lehigh Student Handbook. In addition, Turabian and Gibaldi both contain useful advice.

Exception: Daily essays and reaction essays need not meet any citation standard; don’t bother with footnotes.

Accommodations for Students with Disabilities:

If you have a disability for which you are or may be requesting accommodations, please contact the Office of Academic Support Services, University Center C212 (610-758-4152) as early as possible in the semester. For accommodation to be granted, you must supply me the appropriate documentation in a timely fashion.

Prize Opportunities:

1. Williams Senior Essay Prize. Prizes are large; up to \$1,000. I encourage all of you to compete—for the money, for your future resumes, and for the honor of the department—very important! Of the last seven groups to go through this seminar, class members won four 1st prizes, four 2nds, and several 3rds. No kidding. The requirements are:

-You must have senior standing (if you do not, you might be eligible to submit this year’s paper in next year’s competition); and

-The submission date usually falls during the 1st week of April, which means that you would have to complete your paper on an accelerated schedule.

2. Campbell Social Science Research Prize. Less lucrative and more difficult, but a nationally recognized accomplishment if you manage it. Due in early May.

3. Library Research Prize. \$1,000. The next due date will be in January 2013, but papers from this course will be eligible even if you have graduated.

See me if interested in any of these; I will be glad to work with you. If you want to compete in this Spring’s Williams, contact me quite early in the semester. (If you have a Fall 2011 paper or

ongoing thesis that you would like to work on for possible submission, see either me or the instructor for that course. I routinely offer 1-credit independent studies for this purpose.)

Readings:

There are four required textbooks:

1. Jared Diamond, *Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed* (New York: Penguin, 2006).
2. Daniel Kahneman, *Thinking Fast and Slow* (New York: Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux, 2011).
3. Stephen Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997).
4. Kate L. Turabian et al., *A Manual for Writers of Research Papers, Theses, and Dissertations*, 7th edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007). You will need this as a reference on documentation standards. This book also contains useful advice on style and organization. If you have a copy of Joseph Gibaldi, *MLA Handbook for Writers of Research Papers*, 7th ed. (Modern Language Association, 2009), that is an acceptable alternative

Schedule of Lectures, Topics, and Reading Assignments

Our progress may vary from this schedule; class members are responsible for keeping track of our progress. I will likely update this syllabus more than once based on new scholarship or events; updates will be announced in a timely fashion.

* = item on CourseSite. Unmarked items are in the textbooks.

You will note that most sessions include preparation questions; these are intended to provide some initial focus as you begin reading. They are not intended to dissuade you from other questions, nor to influence your choice of topics for daily essays.

Many sessions also list additional, unassigned readings. To see the entire database, including items on topics not covered this semester, choose 'Files' at the lower left of our CourseSite.

Part I: Designing Social Science Research Projects

1. Tues. January 17: How to Test Arguments, I

*The full syllabus.

*Daily essays assignment.

*Main paper assignment.

*XC reaction essays assignment

*Bibliography XC assignment (all on our CourseSite under 'Assignments').

Part of this session will be taken up with explanation of the syllabus and the research project, but most will be used to begin an exercise on testing explanations in social science.

2.Thurs. January 19: How to Test Arguments, II

All questions on the syllabus and assignments are due at the start of this class.

Continuation of exercise on research design.

3. Tues. January 24: Research Methods and Sources [4] MEDIA CENTER CLASSROOM (379)

Presentation on research sources and methods for ethnic conflict by Roseann Bowerman, social sciences research librarian. Don't be absent. No daily essay for this date.

*Roseann Bowerman, "Research Guide for IR 334" (under 'Assignments,' also accessible through the library's web page under "course guides."

*Chaim Kaufmann, "'Chaining' Sources in Social Science Research" (under 'Assignments.')

4. Thurs. January 26: Hypotheses, Laws, and Theories [42 pp.]

Stephen Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science*, 7-48. Although nominally aimed at graduate students, virtually all of the advice is suited to advanced undergraduates. If you find this challenging, don't worry; this chapter is the most difficult reading in the course. You should finish the book (except for a couple of short sections addressed specifically to Ph.D. students) before the end of the method section of the course. You should raise issues in class as needed.

Starting with this session, daily essays are appropriate for each session with a reading assignment. You may also, as you progress through Van Evera, submit up to 2 additional daily essays on his book between now and the end of the method section of the course.

Continuation of exercise on research design.

January 31 @9:20 A.M.: Research tools assignment due.

5. Tues. January 31: How to Test Arguments, III—Comparative Case Studies [53]

- In selecting cases to study, what should be kept constant and what should—or must—vary?
 - How does Gourevitch select his cases? What role does his 'prediction table' on p. 282 play?
 - Does Gourevitch's effort follow the prescriptions advised by Geddes? By Van Evera?
 - How does Gourevitch define and measure critical concepts? What factual information does he present about each case? What is left out? Why?
 - What should be kept constant about *how* comparative cases are studied? Is there anything that can or should vary?
- Could this technique be helpful for your question?

*Peter Gourevitch, "International Trade, Domestic Coalitions, and Liberty: Comparative Responses to the Crisis of 1873-1896," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 8:2 (Autumn 1977), 281-313.

*Barbara Geddes, "How the Cases You Choose Affect the Answers You Get: Selection Bias in Comparative Politics," *Political Analysis* 2:1 (1990), 131-50.

Also of Interest (not assigned):

David Collier and James Mahoney, "Insights and Pitfalls: Selection Bias in Qualitative Research," *World Politics* 49:1 (October 1996), 56-91.

Harry Eckstein, "Case Study and Theory in Political Science," in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson Polsby, eds., *Handbook of Political Science*, vol. 7 (Addison-Wesley, 1975), 79-137.

- Arend J. Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method," *American Political Science Review* 65:3 (September 1971), 682-93.
- Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," *International Organization* 44:2 (Spring, 1990), 137-68.
- Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," in Michael E. Brown, ed., *Ethnic Conflict and International Security* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), 103-24.
- David M. Edelstein, "Occupational Hazards: Why Military Occupations Succeed or Fail," *International Security* 29:1 (Summer 2004), 49-91. 24 cases; borderline between comparative case study and quantitative.
- John J. Mearsheimer, *Conventional Deterrence* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983).
- Roger Petersen, *Understanding Ethnic Violence: Fear, Hatred, and Resentment in Twentieth-Century Eastern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
- Barry R. Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984).
- Jack L. Snyder, *The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984).

6. Thurs. February 2: How to Test Arguments, IV—Critical Cases [19]

- “Critical case” designs focus on (often just one) case that ought to be especially easy for the argument/theory being tested, hoping to show that it nevertheless fails to predict the outcome (or that a case that ought to be especially hard is successfully predicted).
- What does it mean to say that a case is especially “easy” or “hard” for a theory?
- How does McKeown establish that 19th century British tariff policy is a critical case for hegemonic stability theory?
- Does McKeown show that the theory fails the test?
- How, exactly, is McKeown’s strategy different from Gourevitch’s?
- What should we do next when a theory fails an “easy” critical case test or passes a “hard” one??
- Could this technique be useful for your question?

*Timothy J. McKeown, "Hegemonic Stability Theory and 19th Century Tariff Levels in Europe," *International Organization* 37:1 (Winter 1983), 73-91.

Also of interest (not assigned):

- Alexander B. Downes, "How Smart and Tough are Democracies? Reassessing Theories of Democratic Victory in War," *International Security* 33:4 (Spring 2009), 9-51.
- Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, "Power, Globalization, and the End of the Cold War: Reevaluating a Landmark Case for Ideas," *International Security* 25:3 (Winter, 2000-2001), 5-53. See also correspondence in the Spring 2002 issue.
- Miriam Fendius Elman, "Finland in World War II: Alliances, Small States, and the Democratic Peace," in Elman, ed., *Paths to Peace: Is Democracy the Answer?* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997), 191-232. Can a case be critical if its historical importance is low?
- Chaim Kaufmann, "When All Else Fails: Ethnic Population Transfers and Partitions in the Twentieth Century," *International Security* 23:2 (Fall 1998), 120-56.
- Ido Oren, "The Subjectivity of the 'Democratic' Peace: Changing U.S. Perceptions of Imperial Germany," *International Security* 20:2 (Autumn, 1995), 147-84.

Daryl G. Press, *Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2005).

February 7 @9:20 A.M.: Proposal due.

7. Tues. February 7: Interlude: How to Write a Literature Review [71]

- How are the literature review sections of these papers constructed?
- What issues are emphasized compared to others that get little or no attention? I.e., what is *not* here and how should we think about setting bounds on the tasks of a literature review?
- Do these literature reviews do everything necessary to allow you to understand the test design (Hopf) or analysis (Levy) that follows?
- Does Hopf's table of predictions of the competing theories help? How is the design (and purpose) of his table different from that of Gourevitch's?
- Could Levy have done something similar, and would it have been useful?
- Could the techniques used in these articles be useful for your paper? Give some thought *now* to the main issues that your literature review should cover; try constructing a simple diagram or (very) simple outline.

*Jack Levy, "Power and the Preventive Motivation for War," *World Politics* 40:1 (October 1987), 82-107.

*Ted Hopf, "Soviet Inferences from their Victories in the Periphery: Visions of Resistance or Cumulating Gains?" in Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder, eds., *Dominoes and Bandwagons* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 145-89.

Also of interest (not assigned):

Jack Levy, "Misperception and the Causes of War: Theoretical Linkages and Analytical Problems," *World Politics* 36:1 (October 1983), 76-99. Levy has written a number of excellent review essays.

Scott D. Sagan, "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb," *International Security* 21:3 (Winter, 1996-97), 54-86; and Sagan, "The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons," *International Security* 18:4 (Spring, 1994), 66-107.

John Mearsheimer, "Reckless States and Realism," *International Relations* 23:2 (June 2009), 241-56.

Stephen Walt, "Revolution and War," *World Politics* 44:3 (April 1992), 321-68.

Thomas Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," *International Organization* 44:2 (Spring 1990), 137-68.

Thurs. February 9—NO CLASS.

8. Tues. February 14: How to Test Arguments, V—Intensive Approaches [50]

- Instead of the 'extensive' approach of comparing multiple cases, 'intensive' approaches try to solve the 'degrees of freedom' problem by splitting up a single historical 'case' narrative into a number of separate parts whose outcomes can be treated as independent observations.

- How does Pape's testing method work?
- How does Pape get a number of separate observations out of a single 'case?' What would Geddes or Van Evera have to say about this approach?
- How does he rule out alternative explanations for Japan's decision to surrender?
- What are the advantages and disadvantages of a method that depends on explaining the timing of particular actors' decisions on particular issues?

*Robert A. Pape, *Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996), 87-136: "Why Japan Surrendered."

9. Thurs. February 16: How to Test Arguments, VI—More on Intensive Approaches [30]

- How does Kaufmann's testing method work?
- How does Kaufmann get a number of separate observations out of a single 'case?'
- How does he deal with the problem that none of the theories tested make specific predictions for the behavior of any actor?
- What factual assumptions does Kaufmann have to establish in order to make his testing method valid for this case?
- What are the advantages and disadvantages of intensive approaches compared to extensive ones?
- Are any of the techniques used by either Pape or Kaufmann of potential use to you?

*Chaim Kaufmann, "Out of the Lab and into the Archives: A Method for Testing Psychological Theories of Foreign Policy Decision Making," *International Studies Quarterly* 38:4 (December 1994), 557-86. You can skip the regression equations until session 10.

Also of interest (not assigned):

Richard W. Cottam, *Foreign Policy Motivation: A General Theory and a Case Study* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977). British policy towards Egypt.

John S. Odell, *U.S. International Monetary Policy: Markets, Power, and Ideas as Sources of Change* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982).

10. Tues February 21: How to Test Arguments, VI—Quantitative Approaches [38]

- What proposition is Moon actually testing? (It is not a proposition about Iraq.)
- What more might we do to test this proposition?
- What other propositions about determinants of democratization does Moon not attempt to test? Why not?
- What might we do to test other possible determinants of democratization?
- What are the advantages and disadvantages of trying to measure concepts like 'democracy' or 'salience' quantitatively?
- Your second essay on Van Evera is due no later than today.

*Bruce E. Moon, "Long Time Coming: Prospects for Democracy in Iraq," *International Security* 33:4 (Spring 2009), 111-48.

*Kaufmann, "Out of the Lab and Into the Archives," regression equations and accompanying discussion.

Also of interest (not assigned):

- Katherine Barbieri, "Economic Interdependence: A Path to Peace or a Source of Interstate Conflict?" *Journal of Peace Research* 33:1 (February 1996), 29-49.
- Page Fortna, "Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace after Civil War," *International Studies Quarterly* 48:2 (May 2004), 269-92.
- Christopher Gelpi, Peter D. Feaver, and Jason Reifler, "Success Matters: Casualty Sensitivity and the War in Iraq," *International Security* 30:3 (Winter, 2005-2006), 7-46.
- Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, "Normative and Structural Causes of the Democratic Peace, 1946-1986," *American Political Science Review* 87:3 (September 1993), 624-38. Be careful of the measure of "democracy."
- Bruce E. Moon and William J. Dixon, "Politics, the State, and Basic Human Needs: A Cross-National Study," *American Journal of Political Science* 29:4 (November 1985), 661-93.
- Sonali Singh and Christopher R. Way, "The Correlates of Nuclear Proliferation: A Quantitative Test," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48:6 (December 2004): 859-85.
- Dan Reiter and Alan C. Stam III, "Democracy, War Initiation, and Victory," *American Political Science Review* 92:2 (June, 1998), 377-89.

Part II: Political Psychology11. Thurs. February 23: Quick Tour of Cognitive and Social Psychology [99]

- 'System 1' and 'System 2' and shorthand for decision-making (or assessment) procedures that don't really correspond to fully distinct systems in our brains. What is the real difference?
- If we could use System 2 all the time, would that help?
- How about somewhat more often? How should we decide when? Can we decide when?
- Try some of the exercises mentioned by Kahneman.
- Try the 'Florida Experiment' (pp. 53-54). Recruit two subjects, one at a time. Without explaining anything, ask each to take a short walk (say 40' or more) and return (perhaps an errand). Time them using a stopwatch or clock with second hand (close precision is not important). For one but not the other, give a short discourse beforehand on properties of elderly people similar to the example on p. 53. Record the times and report in class.
- Which of the effects discussed surprises or disturbs you the most (or seems to you doubtful)?
- Think of a foreign policy decision (or class of decisions) where you think that one or more of these effects may have mattered to the outcome(s). (How about potential future decisions?)
- This reading (and #s 12 and 14) are good choices for double submissions if you are eligible. Write one how to decide whether or when to take the effect(s) seriously, the other on policy impact if the (different) effect(s) discussed in that essay are taken fully seriously.

Daniel Kahneman, *Thinking Fast and Slow* (New York: Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux, 2011), 3-15, 19-105.

*Kaufmann, "Summary of I.R. Department Social Psych Survey, Spring 2012" (2012).

Of interest (not assigned):

Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, N.J. Princeton University Press, 1976).

Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky, eds., *Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982).

Richard Nisbett and Lee Ross, *Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1980).

Irving L. Janis and Leon Mann, *Decision Making: A Psychological Analysis of Conflict, Choice, and Commitment* (New York: Free Press, 1977).

February 28 @9:20 A.M.: Literature review due.

12. Tues. February 28: Heuristics and Biases [87]

- Can you think of any situations where the 'law of small numbers' has led you to important errors?
- How about anchoring?
- Availability?
- Representativeness?
- Inattention to base rates?
- Regression to the mean?
- If you cannot recall significant errors resulting from some (or any) of these, why do you think that is?
- Do you plan to make use in your own life of any of Kahneman's advice on minimizing biases?
- Try the anchoring experiment on p. 122 on ten subjects, dividing them into two groups given different numbers as anchors (or any other experiment suggested to you by something in this section; in any case, take subjects one at a time and explain nothing about your purposes).
- Think of a foreign policy decision (or class of decisions) where you think that one or more of these effects may have mattered to the outcome(s). (How about potential future decisions?)

Kahneman, 109-95.

13. Thurs. March 1: Overconfidence [67]

- How often do you think you adjust your memories of your own past expectations to match better events since then?
- How often do you think you overestimate the validity of your own judgments?
- How often do you think you think you rely on intuition when following a rigid algorithm would reduce error?
- How often do you think that you are overoptimistic about prospects for success of your endeavors?
- How much can you know about how often you make any of these types of errors?
- For each of these error types, do you think increasing consequences of error would make them more or less likely? What about other conditions that might influence them?
- How serious do you estimate the costs for you of each of these error types (and/or benefits in the case of overoptimism)?
- Think of a foreign policy decision (or class of decisions) where you think that one or more of these effects may have mattered to the outcome(s). (How about potential future decisions?)

Kahneman, 199-265.

SPRING BREAK

14. Tues. March 13: Choices Under Risk [106]

Kahneman, 269-374.

15. Thurs. March 15: Psychology and Foreign Policy Beliefs [69]

- How useful is the concept of the fundamental attribution error? Is it useful for other foreign policy problems besides threat inflation (and/or for domestic policy problems)?
- How useful is the concept of loss aversion? For what problems is it useful?
- What happens when people encounter valid information that challenges emotionally important beliefs? What does this imply for politics and foreign policy?
- In principle all these mechanisms must operate through domestic politics. What is distinctive about psychological explanations?
- Are you persuaded that psychological biases explain the sources of threat inflation or other undesirable leadership decisions/behaviors?
- Are you persuaded that they explain why such behaviors often succeed in controlling behaviors?

Reminder: when there are three or more substantial items, your daily essay should engage at least two of them, preferably in light of each other.

Stephen Van Evera, "Foreword," in A. Trevor Thrall and Jane K. Cramer, eds., *American Foreign Policy and the Politics of Fear: Threat Inflation since 9/11* (London: Routledge, 2009), xi-xvi.
 Robert Jervis, "Understanding Beliefs and Threat Inflation," in Thrall and Cramer, 16-39.
 Daniel Kahneman and Jonathan Renshon, "Hawkish Biases," in Thrall and Cramer, 79-96.
 *Monica Prasad et al., "'There Must Be a Reason:' Osama, Saddam, and Inferred Justification," *Sociological Inquiry* 79:2 (May 2009), 142-62.

16. Tues. March 20: Psychology, Politics, and Policy: Threat inflation [58]

- To what extent do Van Evera's, Kaufmann's, Rousseau and Garcia-Retamero's, and Snyder's (and Walt's implied) definitions of threat inflation (and Kaufmann's, next session) agree? If you find the differences substantial, do they affect content of the arguments or the problems they can address?
- How much of each of Rousseau and Garcia-Retamero's, Snyder's and Walt's explanations are 'purely' political or constructivist versus depending (somewhat? heavily?) on some of the psychological effects that we have discussed?
- How persuasive is each?
- Do any make sense of repeating patterns in U.S. foreign policy debates previously hard for you to explain, and/or that concern you for the future? What can or should be done?

*Chaim Kaufmann, "Threat Inflation and the Failure of the Marketplace of Ideas," *International Security* 29:1 (Summer 2004), 8-9.

- *David L. Rousseau and Rocio Garcia-Retamaro, "Estimating Threats: The Impact and Interaction of Identity and Power," in Thrall and Cramer, 54-78.
- *Jack Snyder, "Imperial Myths and Threat Inflation," in Thrall and Cramer, 40-53.
- *Stephen M. Walt, "The Threatmonger's Handbook," *Foreign Policy.com* blog, May 4, 2009.

Of interest (not assigned):

- Jane K. Cramer and A. Trevor Thrall, "Introduction: Understanding Threat Inflation," in Thrall and Cramer, 1-15.
- Stephen D. Krasner, "Policy Making in a Weak State," in G. John Ikenberry, ed., *American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays* (New York: HarperCollins, 1989), 292-317.
- Stephen Van Evera, "Why States Believe Foolish Ideas: Non-Self-Evaluation by Government and Society," paper presented to the American Political Science Association, Sept. 1988.
- Jack L. Snyder, *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition* (Cornell University Press, 1991).
- Alexander Downes, "How Smart and Tough Are Democracies? Reassessing Theories of Democratic Victory in War," *International Security* 33:4 (Spring 2009), 9-51.

17. Tues. March 22: The Iraq War Debate [48]

- Are you satisfied that the threat posed by Iraq was inflated in U.S. policy debates leading up to March 19, 2003? What more might you want to know?
- To what extent are Kaufmann and/or Western relying on domestic political, constructivist, and/or psychological explanations and to what extent on factors not mentioned in our readings so far?
- Are you persuaded by Kaufmann's explanation of why threat inflation succeeded?
- Why is Kaufmann unable to decide among five explanations? Do you like one or two of them better than the others? Why?
- To what extent do either Kaufmann or Western reinforce explanations offered by Rousseau and G-R, Snyder, or Walt, or compete with some or all of them?
- What do you now think can or should be done?

- *TomPaine.com, "I Want YOU to Invade Iraq," *New York Times*, September 25, 2002.
- *33 National Security Scholars, "War with Iraq is Not in America's National Interest," *New York Times* September 26, 2002.
- *Chaim Kaufmann, "Threat Inflation and the Failure of the Marketplace of Ideas," *International Security* 29:1 (Summer 2004), remainder of article.
- *Mark Poyser, "Diagram of Iraq War Intelligence Failures."
<http://www.threetwoone.org/uggabugga/2004/pentagon-spy02.gif>
- *Jon Western, "The War Over Iraq; Selling War to the American Public," in Thrall and Cramer, 153-73.

Of interest (not assigned):

- Ronald R. Krebs and Chaim Kaufmann, Correspondence, *International Security* 29:4 (Spring 2005), 196-207.
- A. Trevor Thrall, "A Bear in the Woods? Threat Framing in the Marketplace of Values," *Security Studies* 16:3 (July 2007), 252-88.
- Ronald R. Krebs and Jennifer Lobasz, "The Sound of Silence: Rhetorical Coercion, Democratic Acquiescence, and the Iraq War," in Thrall and Cramer, 117-133.

- Jane K. Cramer, "Militarized Patriotism and the Success of Threat Inflation," in Thrall and Cramer, 135-52.
- Kenneth Pollack, "The Erosion of Containment," in *The Threatening Storm* (New York: Random House, 2002), 211-42. The most important intellectual who made the pro-war case.
- Brian Schmidt and Michael Williams, "The Bush Doctrine and the Iraq War: Neoconservatives Versus Realists," *Security Studies* 17:2 (April 2008), 191-220.
- Steven Kull, Clay Ramsay, and Evan Lewis, "Misperceptions, the Media, and the Iraq War," *Political Science Quarterly* 118:4 (Winter 2003-2004), 569-98.
- John Mueller, "Inflating Terrorism," in Thrall and Cramer, 192-209.

March 27 @9:20 A.M.: Test design due.

Part III. Climate, Collective Action, and Other Problems

18. Thurs. March 27: Collective Action and the Tragedy of the Commons [66]

- What is the 'tragedy of the commons?' Why does it arise?
- What are 'jointness of supply' and 'excludable' and 'non-excludable' goods?
- What are 'externalities?'
- What are some real-world problems which have been made more difficult to resolve by collective action dynamics?
- Under what circumstances can effective collective action be organized (and sustained)? What are some real-world problems where this might be possible?

*Garrett Hardin, "The Tragedy of the Commons," *Science* 162 (December 13, 1968), 1243-1248.

*Russell Hardin, *Collective Action* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), 6-66.

Also of interest (not assigned):

- Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action* (Cambridge: Harvard University Economics Department, 1965, 1971); Olson, *The Rise and Decline of Nations* (Yale University Press, 1982).
- Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation* (New York: Basic Books, 1984).
- Garrett Hardin and John Baden, eds., *Managing the Commons* (W.H. Freeman, 1977).
- Elinor Ostrom, *Governing the Commons* (Cambridge University Press, 1990); Ostrom, "Community and the Endogenous Solution of Commons Problems," *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 4:3 (1992): 343-351.
- Thomas Dietz, Elinor Ostrom, and Paul C. Stern, "The Struggle to Govern the Commons," *Science* 302 (December 12, 2003), 1907-1912.
- Bob Lloyd, "The Commons Revisited: The Tragedy Continues," *Energy Policy* 35:11 (November 2007, 5806 ff.
- John R. Oneal and Paul F. Diehl, "The Theory of Collective Action and NATO Defense Burdens: New Empirical Tests," *Political Research Quarterly*, 47:2 (June, 1994), 373-396.
- Digital Library of the Commons, <http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/>

No session 2012: Fisheries and Collective Action [68]

- Is overexploitation of fisheries always mainly a collective action problem? What other factors might influence over-fishing?
- What solutions to over-fishing can work? In what circumstances?
- How optimistic or pessimistic should we be about the future of this problem? In the U.S.? In other countries? Globally?

- *Jeffrey A. Hutchings and John D. Reynolds, "Marine Fish Population Collapses: Consequences for Recovery and Extinction Risk," *Bioscience* 54:4 (April 2004), 297-309.
- *James M. Acheson, "Lobster and Groundfish Management in the Gulf of Maine: A Rational Choice Perspective," *Human Organization* 65:3 (Fall 2006), 240-52.
- *Toddi A. Steelman and Richard L. Wallace, "Property Rights and Property Wrongs: Why Context Matters in Fisheries Management," *Policy Sciences* 34:3-4 (December 2001), 357-79.
- *Craig Johnson, "Community Formation and Fisheries Conservation in Southern Thailand," *Development and Change* 32:5 (2001), 954-74.

Also of interest (not assigned):

- Frank Alcock, "Bargaining, Uncertainty, and Property Rights in Fisheries," *World Politics* 54:4 (July 2002), 437-61.
- R. Quentin Grafton, Ragnar Arnason, Trond Bjørndal, David Campbell, et al. "Incentive-based Approaches to Sustainable Fisheries," *Canadian Journal of Fisheries and Aquatic Sciences* 63:3 (March 2006) 699-710.
- Maarten Bavinck, "Fisher Regulations along the Coromandel Coast: A Case of Collective Control of Common Pool resources," *Marine Policy* 20:6 (1996), 475-82.
- Anna Vinson, "Deep Sea Bottom Trawling and the Eastern Tropical Pacific Seascape: A Test Case for Global Action," *Georgetown International Environmental Law Review* 18:2 (Winter 2006), 355-83. Advocates a complete ban.

19. Thurs. March 29: Climate Change [62]

- How serious a problem is climate change?
- How certain can we be about human action in causing/mitigating climate change?
- Why hasn't the U.S. signed on to the Kyoto Protocol (or to an alternative international agreement on mitigating climate change)?
- Why hasn't China?
- What do we do if Seager et al. (and others) are right that serious things are happening already?

Pieter Tans and Ralph Keeling, "Trends in Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide," National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Earth System Research Laboratory).

http://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/ccgg/trends/#mlo_full

- *Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, "4th Assessment Report: Climate Change 2007; Working Group I: The Physical Science Basis: Summary for Policy Makers" (IPCC: February 5, 2007), 9-18. Note that you need p. 18 to understand the chart on p. 14. If you want more on the science, see the FAQ for part I at http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg1/en/faqs.html
- *IPCC, "4th Assessment Report, Working Group II: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability: Summary for Policy Makers (IPCC, April 5, 2007).
- *IPCC, "4th Assessment Report, Working Group III: Mitigation of Climate Change: Summary for Policy Makers (IPCC, May 4, 2007).

Hadley Centre/Met Office Climate Change Projections for 2100. <http://www.metoffice.gov.uk/climate-change/guide/future/projections>. Watch animations on their youtube channel. See Elisabeth Jeffries, "Climate Models," *research*eu* 63 (April 2010), 6th and 12th paras, for explanations of scenarios A1B (used in IPCC and Hadley projections) and E1 (Hadley but not IPCC 4th report; will be in 5th). http://ec.europa.eu/research/research-eu/63/article_6314_en.html.

*Richard Seager et al., "Model Projections of an Imminent Transition to a More Arid Climate in Southwestern North America," *Science* 316:5828 (May 25, 2007), 1181-84.

Optional: Université Catholique de Louvain, Institut d'Astronomie et de Géophysique, "Java Climate Model," February 23, 2009. <http://www.astr.ucl.ac.be/users/matthews/jcm/index.html>. Download, read the documentation, and play around. Some of the parameters you can manipulate correspond to scenarios in IPCC 2007. Also, some are easy to understand while others may be obscure to non-experts (for help browse IPCC Report Group I, chapter 10, "Global Climate Projections").

You may submit an additional daily essay on this date if the 2nd is on three or more scenarios that you investigated using the JCM.

Also of interest (not assigned):

IPCC, 4th Assessment Report (2007). The 5th report is due in 2013-14.

http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/publications_and_data_reports.shtml#1.

Robert Collier, "A Warming World; China About to Pass U.S. as World's Top Generator of Greenhouse Gases," *San Francisco Chronicle*, March 5, 2007.

Sindhya Bhanoo, "Seas Grow Less Effective at Absorbing Emissions." *New York Times*, November 19, 2009.

Gregg Easterbrook, "Global Warming: Who Loses—And Who Wins?" *Atlantic*, April 2007, 52-66.

20. Tues. April 3: Past Collapses, I: Greenland [66+]

-Why did the Norse colonies in Greenland fail?

-What dysfunctional values, procedures, or habits of thinking do you see in American society and/or other societies?

-Is the United States pursuing policies that are likely to damage the interests of the state or the citizenry? Why?

-Is the United States, or other important societies, or both, pursuing policies that are likely to damage the interests of many or most human beings? Why?

Jared Diamond, *Collapse: How Societies Choose to Succeed or Fail* (New York: Penguin, 2005), read for enjoyment 178-210; prepare 211-76, plates 15-18.

21. Thurs. April 5: Past Collapses, II—and Future Ones? [82+]

-Why did Mayan society collapse?

-Do the collapses of Mayan, Greenland, and Easter Island societies hold lessons for China today? For the whole world?

-Is Diamond right that world today 'has no outside' in the same sense as was true of Mayan, Greenland, and Easter Island societies?

Diamond, *Collapse*, read for enjoyment 79-119, prepare 157-77, 358-377, 486-525, plates 5-8, 12-14, 25-27, 31-42.

April 10—NO CLASS.

22. Thurs. April 12: Values and Incentives [68]

- Is the problem of global carrying capacity best approached as an international collective action problem, a domestic political problem, a values problem, or something else?
- Is the U.S. Republican Party the biggest barrier to useful action on climate change? If so, can anything be done about it?

Diamond, *Collapse*, 419-485.

*Erik Solheim, "Is the US Republican Party a Long-term Problem for Climate Change?" *Debating Europe*, September 30, 2011.

<http://www.debatingeurope.eu/2011/09/30/are-the-us-republican-party-a-problem-for-climate-change/>

To be obtained: *Tim Phillips, interview in *National Review*, December 2011.

Also of interest (not assigned):

David Brin, "A Glass Half Empty," *San Diego Union Book Review*, January 2, 2005. Review of Diamond.

Katherine Bagley, "GOP Not Listening to Its Own Scientists on Climate Change," *Inside Climate News*, February 22, 2012. <http://insideclimatenews.org/news/20120221/republicans-santorum-romney-gingrich-climate-scientists-scientific-consensus-skeptics-kerry-emanuel>

David G. Victor, *Global Warming Gridlock: Creating More Effective Strategies for Protecting the Planet* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

Barbara Tuchman, *The March of Folly: From Troy to Vietnam* (New York: Knopf, 1984).

Jared Diamond, *Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1999).

23. Tues. April 17: International Transmission of Values [c. 44]

*Norman Girardot, Gordon Bearn et al., "Global Citizenship: Vision and First Principles" (November 2003).

*Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, "Transnational Activist Networks," in Robert Art and Robert Jervis, eds., *International Politics*, 6th ed. (2000), 547-53.

*Chaim Kaufmann and Robert A. Pape, "The Determinants of International Moral Action," *International Organization* 53:4 (Autumn 1999), 637-68.

- Can 'global citizenship' be taught to university students? To the American public at large? To political leaders?
- How persuasive is Keck and Sikkink's case that moral norms can be transmitted internationally versus that of Kaufmann and Pape argument that they generally cannot?

-What would have to be accomplished in altering moral norms in order to make a difference in addressing climate change?

Also of interest (not assigned):

Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists Across Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1998).

Ernst B. Haas, *Beware the Slippery Slope: Notes Toward the Definition of Justifiable Intervention* (University of California Press, 1993) chapters 1-4.

Samantha Power, "Bystanders to Genocide: Why the U.S. Let the Rwanda Tragedy Happen," *Atlantic* (September 2001).

Amity Shlaes, "Slavery's Link to the War on Terror," *Financial Times* (London) (November 3, 2003).

April 19 @9:20 A.M.: First draft of final paper due.

24. Thurs. April 19: Climate Change Simulation, I

*Kaufmann, "Parts per Million: A Collective Action Game," rules for the 1st game.

25. Tues. April 24: Climate Change Simulation, II

*Kaufmann, "Parts per Million," rules for the 2nd game.

*(optional) "'Geoengineering' to Fight Global Warming?" *Associated Press*, April 8, 2009.

*(optional) David G. Victor et al., "The Geoengineering Option," *Foreign Affairs* 88:2 (March/April 2009), 64-76.

You may write a daily essay on the Geoengineering pieces for this date.

26. Thurs. April 26: Climate Change Simulation, III

*Kaufmann, "Parts per Million," rules for the 3rd game.

After completion of all three simulations, you may write a daily essay on what you think you gained from the simulations. Your essay should engage with at least some of the assumptions in the simulation rules as well as with some aspect of the climate science that we read for session 19 that you did not write about at that time. Due at the same time as the final paper.

[APPROXIMATE] Monday April 30-Tuesday May 1. Paper critique meetings.

May 9 @ 4:00 P.M.: Final assignment due. Get this time-stamped by Jo Engel in MG 207.

No final exam.