IR 34: SOCIETY, TECHNOLOGY, AND WAR SINCE THE RENAISSANCE
(4 credit hours) CRN: 48614 – Revised 12/07/2013

Chaim Kaufmann

E-mail: cko7
Office hours (208 Maginnes): Tu Th 10:45-12:00; or by appointment.
CourseSite: IR-034-010-FL13

Course Objective:
War has been a consistent part of human experience. It has been with us as long as people have cared about control over territory – at least since the beginning of agriculture c. 10,000 B.C.E. Today the United States is at war again for the sixth – and seventh (since we are in two wars at once) – times since 1990.

War and human societies shape each other. To understand how, we must do more than describe the events. How is the conduct of war affected by the political, economic, and technological organization of society? And how do battle outcomes – as well as mobilization needs to prepare society for actual or possible wars – force society to reorganize itself? The political, economic, and social systems in which we live now have been largely determined by the need of states to organize themselves for war. This course examines the major causal effects in both directions from late Medieval times to the present, and explores some possible near future trends.

The goal of this course is to prepare you to understand what our society and others can and cannot accomplish by war, and how our society we as individuals may be affected by engaging in war – including by Afghanistan and Iraq and by possible future confrontations with opponents whom we cannot yet guess.

This course is not primarily concerned with questions such as “why are there wars at all?” or “is a war-free world possible?” These and related questions are taken up in IR 234 (Great Power Politics), IR 235 (International Security), IR 36 (International Terrorism), and IR 132 (Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict).

Course Outline:
I. Renaissance and Early Modern War (to c. 1815)
II. Industrialized War (c. 1850-1945)
III. The Nuclear and Electronic Revolutions (1945-present)
IV. New Adversaries, New Wars
V. Into the 21st Century

Prerequisites:
None. This course is intended to be accessible to students with no previous knowledge of international politics or of military issues.

Requirements:
1. There are about 20 sessions for which you will need to prepare readings. Readings (and films) are always due before class.
As our progress may not match the planned schedule, you are responsible for keeping track.

2. The course format is mixed seminar and lecture; balance will vary depending on material. In general, the less lecture and the more discussion, the better; if we fall behind schedule as a result that will mean that we are doing well.

Students are expected to participate energetically. Your interventions are part of your responsibility to educate yourself, your colleagues, and me. Do interrupt me with a comment or question at any time. If I put you off for a moment to finish a thought I will get back to you promptly. If I forget for more than a moment, insist on being heard.

See ‘How to Be Effective in a Social Science Seminar’ on our CourseSite.

3. Do not disrupt the class. Laptops are permitted for purposes of taking notes. Other electronic devices are prohibited.

4. An analytical essay due on September 26 and a literature essay due on October 31. The first will be posted on our CourseSite several days before the due date; the second is posted now. See the memo on submission of assignments on our CourseSite.

5. A midterm on October 22 and a final when scheduled by the Registrar. These will include a small number of “short answer” questions as well as one to three essays. A “superset” of possible essays will be published in advance of each exam.

A memo on how to prepare for the short answer portion is provided on our CourseSite. Prior to each exam there will be a review session at which we can discuss the proposed questions that you have generated in that process. You can of course contact me at any time.

Readings:
There will be about five required textbooks for this course. Not in the bookstore. I recommend Amazon.com, Barnes & Noble.com, Alibris, BookCloseouts.com, or other online vendors. Use a bot such as pricegrabber.com.


Grading:
Seminar contribution 10%
Analytical essay 10%
Literature essay 20%
Midterm exam 20%
Final exam 40%

Extra credit opportunities:
If you attend a non-course lecture, at Lehigh or elsewhere, on a topic related to this course and submit a 1-1½ page reaction paper qualify for credit equal to 1% of the final course grade (maximum limit 5%). A document called “Instructions for IR 34 XC Reaction Papers” can be found under ‘Assignments.’

**Intellectual Integrity:**
The Department of International Relations Policy on Academic Integrity and Plagiarism is hereby incorporated into this syllabus. A copy will be posted on the course web site. See also the relevant pages of your Lehigh Student Handbook.

**Accommodation for Students with Disabilities:**
Students who have a disability for which you are or may be requesting accommodation should contact both the instructor and the Office of Academic Support Services University Center 212 (610-758-4152) as early as possible in the semester. You must obtain documentation from Academic Support Services before accommodation can be granted.

**Schedule and Reading Assignments:**
The schedule shown is tentative. As mentioned, our progress will likely vary from this schedule. You can, however, count on exam and assignment due dates. (You will also see that we are going to miss three dates; this may compel us to schedule one or more make-up sessions.)

Each session listing includes questions that you may want to keep in mind while preparing. These are not meant to be exhaustive or as exam preparation.

* = item on CourseSite under ‘Course Documents;’ others in textbooks. Contact me promptly if you discover a corrupt file or any other problem with a document on our CourseSite

---

**I. RENAISSANCE AND EARLY MODERN WAR**

1. **Tues. August 27: Why Study War? [64 pp.]**

- What is war?
- What are “offense” and “defense” and why does the distinction matter?
- What are “strategy,” “operations,” and “tactics?”
- According to Clausewitz, what is the purpose of military operations in war? What is the ultimate purpose behind this immediate purpose?
- What does Clausewitz mean when he says that “war is the continuation of politics by other means”? In what way can this be considered policy advice?
- According to Clausewitz, what are some of the ways in which war is different in theory and in practice? Which do you consider most important?
- How do technology and forms of political and social organization affect war, and how do war and war mobilization efforts affect the organization of society?

*This syllabus, the literature assignment, “How to Be effective in a Social Science Seminar;” and “Advice on Preparation for an IR 34 Exam.” Questions due at the start of the session.*
*Chaim Kaufmann, “Terminology for Modern War;” “Strategic-Level Offense-Defense Balances in Land Warfare, >1300-2010?;” and “Impact of Logistics and Infrastructure on Operational and Strategic-Level Offense-Defense Balances, >1300-2010?”

Also of interest (not assigned):

2. Thurs. August 29: The Late Medieval Baseline [89]

- What are the main organizing, disintegrating, reformative, and ideational effects of war? Which were most important in Late Medieval Western Europe?
- Why did the strategic defense have such a large advantage over offense in Medieval Europe?
- Why was the offense/defense balance in China different from that in Europe?
- What effect did/does the offense/defense balance have on the organization of states?
- What effects did new weaponry and taxation in money have on the organization of armies?
- What effects did these have on battles?
- What role did war play in destroying feudalism and creating states?
- Why did men fight during this period?

Kenneth Branagh, dir., *Henry V* (1989). Watch the “We few, we happy few” speech. [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=680NIR13v2I](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=680NIR13v2I)

Also of interest (not assigned):


- How did gunpowder affect the balance between offense and defense in war?
- What effect did this have on the size and cohesion of states?
- Why didn’t states grow without limit?

Van Creveld, *Technology and War*, 81-123.

Thurs. September 5: No class

4: Tues. September 10: The Early Modern State and its Army [74]

- Why did wars become less bloody after 1648?
- What were the foreign policy objectives of these wars?
- How did technology play a role in limiting war?
- What effect did the social composition of armies have on the function and conduct of war?
- What measures that might have increased the military power of European states during this period were not taken? Why not?


Also of interest (not assigned):

5. Thurs. September 12: The Great Social Revolution and the Nation in Arms [86]

- How do nationalism and pluralism affect the recruitment of armies?
- How do they affect the capabilities of armies?
- How do they affect the foreign policy options of states?
- How do all these things affect the structure of the state?
- What is the connection between war and the ‘welfare state?’ Between war and universal public education?
II. INDUSTRIALIZED WAR

September 17: Analytical Essay Available

6. Tues. September 17: Railroads and Rifles [63]

- Should the effects of nationalism and of industrialization be thought of as mutual reinforcing, separate and independent, or contrary?
- How did mechanization of transport increase the capabilities of armies and in what ways did it decrease them?
- What do soldiers and armies do when frontal attack becomes impossible?
- What is the relationship between industrialization and “war of attrition?”
- How did states change to cope with the costs of industrialized war? How were the costs distributed across society?
- What did U.S. Civil War soldiers fight for?


Also of interest (not assigned):
Bruce Catton, *Mr. Lincoln’s Army; Glory Road; and A Stillness at Appomattox* (New York: Doubleday/Anchor).

Thurs. September 19: No class

7. Tues. September 24: How Europe Conquered the World (and Some of Why) [79]

- Why did late-19th century European states think that acquiring colonies had become more valuable than earlier?
- To what extent were colonial adventures an effect of European racism and to what extent a cause of it?
- What technological changes played the largest role in enabling European colonialism?
- Why couldn’t India and China resist European penetration?
Ellis, Social History of the Machine Gun, 47-107.

Also of interest (not assigned):
Adam Hochschild, King Leopold’s Ghost (Mariner, 1999).
Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism (pamphlet; Petrograd, 1917).

September 26, 1:10 P.M.: Analytical Essay Due

8. Thurs. September 26: Film Discussion (watch before this date)

- Did the concept of personal or national “glory” ever make any sense?
- If it did, do the actions depicted in this film qualify?
- Did glory “die?” When and of what?


Also of interest (not assigned):
William Shakespeare, Henry V.
Charles Frazier, Cold Mountain (Atlantic Monthly, 1997).
Erich Maria Remarque, All Quiet on the Western Front (Propylaeum Verlag/Little, Brown, 1929).
Kurt Vonnegut, Slaughterhouse Five (Delacorte, 1969).


- How did technological and economic changes between c. 1860 and the start of World War I alter the offense/defense balance for major war?
- How did changes in social and political organization affect the ODB?
- What was the ‘Cult of the Offensive?’ What were the principal errors, and who made them?
- What was the effect of the cult on the prewar planning of the major European powers?
- What additional reasons contributed to the offensive strategic plans of the European major powers?
- What was the effect on the actual shape, scope, and costs of the war?

Also of interest (not assigned):

Thurs. October 3: No class

10. Tues. October 8: Military Institutions and Civil-Military Relations [64]

- What does Porter mean by the ‘totalitarian’ or ‘mass mobilization’ state? What factors contributed to its rise?
- What does Posen mean by “offense,” “defense,” and “deterrence?” “Integration” and “disintegration?” Innovation?”
- What interests do military institutions have simply because they are permanent organizations? (Do they have other interests? Where do those come from?)
- How can an institution’s interests differ from or interfere with the tasks entrusted to it by society?
- Compared to other types of governing bureaucracies, are military institutions more, less, or differently vulnerable to such distortions?
- On how much would Porter, Snyder, Posen, and Clausewitz agree?
- What would Posen or Clausewitz advise the U.S. or other countries today to do to better align military institutions’ behavior with society’s purposes?

Porter, 195-212.
Clausewitz, *On War*, is relevant again here.

Also of interest (not assigned):
11. Thurs. October 10: The Generation that Died in the Mud [90]

- In what ways did World War I compel changes in the recruiting, training, supply, command, supply, and care of soldiers?
- In what ways did World War compel changes in strategy and tactics?
- Why did commanders persist after 1914-15 in tactics that routinely cost hundreds of thousands of casualties for meaningless gains?
- Why did soldiers continue to obey orders to attack after 1914-15?
- How did soldiers cope with the strains of continuous battle?

*Poems: John McRae, "In Flanders Fields;" Wilfred Owen, "Dulce et Decorum Est;" Herbert Read, “To a Conscript of 1940.”

12. Thurs. October 17: Total War and Society [88]

- How did changes in society cause (or were they caused by?) the transitions from pre-industrial war to industrialized war to total war?
- What effect did total war have on the distinction between soldiers and noncombatants?
- What effect did total war have on political, social, and economic organization?
- How much of the progress of democracy in Western Europe and the U.S. after 1918 was due to war mobilization needs?
- How much of the failure of democracy in Central and Eastern Europe after 1918 was due to the same causes?
- What effect did World War I have on the ideal of “progress?”

Porter, 149-93, 212-222, 269-75.

13. Tues. October 22: Midterm Exam


- Why did mobile warfare succeed so well in 1939-41, but less well from about 1942 onward?
- What does mobile warfare do to the supply requirements of armies, and what effects does this have on operations and strategy?
- Why didn’t the sides in the American Civil War or World War I attack enemy civilians directly as often as was done during World War II?
- Why didn’t airpower have as decisive an impact on the outcome of World War II as its proponents expected?
• Is there a moral difference between bombing factories and “infrastructure,” killing or impoverishing civilians in the process, and the deliberate fire-bombing of residential districts?
• Can mobile warfare techniques enable the weaker side to win a major power war, or is the side with the larger economic resources bound to win any war?


Also of interest (not assigned):
Giulio Douhet, *The Command of the Air* (many editions; originally published 1921).  
The rest of Milward.

15. Tues. October 29: More Total War [83]

• Do totalitarian and freer societies wage war for the same purposes, or in the same ways?
• Is it (or why is it) necessary to mobilize hatred of the enemy? Does this vary depending on type of regime or type of war?
• Can hatred of the ‘enemy’ nation or culture actually make warfighting less effective?
• What are “primary groups” and what purpose do they serve?
• In Vietnam U.S. enlisted soldiers served 1 year tours and officers 6 months. What effect might this rapid rotation of individuals have had on group cohesion?
• In Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. troops have normally served tours of 12-16 months, with unit—not individual—rotation. Is this superior to our Vietnam policy? What if some units serve three or more rotations?

Porter, 228-41, 275-96.  
*John W. Dower, War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War* (New York: Pantheon, 1986), selected cartoons. Note that the Japanese ones are mainly government efforts while the Americans are mainly commercial products.  

Also of interest (not assigned):
The rest of Dower, Schaffer, and Bartov.

Thurs. October 31, 1:10. P.M. Literature Essay Due

III. The Nuclear and Electronic Revolutions


- What do ICBM, SLBM, MIRV, EMP, BMD, and MAD stand for?
- What are “deterrence by denial” and “deterrence by punishment?”
- What are strategic “first-strike” and “second-strike” capabilities?
- Could it ever be rational to carry out a nuclear deterrent threat? Does it matter?
- What is the stability/instability paradox, and how much should it concern us?
- Is there such a thing as “nuclear superiority?” If the U.S. could attain it relative to Russia or China, would that be desirable?
- What makes the ‘Nuclear Revolution’ a revolution in international politics?
- How much of the credit for the ‘Long Peace’ should be given to nuclear deterrence? What other factors might account for it?

*Kaufmann, “Terms of Relevance to Nuclear Deterrence” (2012). By the end of this section of the course, you should be familiar with all these terms and acronyms.

Also of interest (not assigned):
Jervis, Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution, rest of book.


17. Tues. November 5: Nuclear Revolution, II: Strategic Defenses and Proliferation [74]

- If we could build a working strategic defense shield, would that be desirable? What about a limited shield to defend against attacks from certain 'rogue states'?
- Why are we deploying ground-based BMD and developing sea-based BMD if most experts do not believe that they can work?
- What states might want to develop nuclear weapons? Why?
- What are the requirements for producing a nuclear weapon? What states could do it?
- Is the spread of nuclear weapons a good thing or a bad thing?
- What should we do about Iran now?
- Is there a risk that non-state terrorists might acquire nuclear weapons?

*Chaim Kaufmann, "Status of Major U.S. BMD Programs 2013."
**Khamenei: Production and Stockpiling of Nuclear Weapons is a Big Sin,” *Press TV* (Iran), February 2, 2012. A consistent position. [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a4csXqeNdrs](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a4csXqeNd rs)

Also of interest (not assigned):
Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff William J. Crowe and 48 other generals and admirals, “Open Letter to President George W. Bush,” Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation (March 26, 2004).

Thurs. November 7: No class

18. Tues. November 12: Film Discussion

• We will take this day for additional discussion of nuclear strategy issues, impact of the nuclear revolution on politics and society, and the film.

Stanley Kubrick, dir., Dr. Strangelove (1964).
19. Thurs. November 14: The Electronic and Information Revolutions

- What do the letters GPS, PGM, LGB, ATGM, and SAM stand for? What is “stealth?”
- How does the electronic revolution (the improvement in sensor and weapons accuracy) alter warfare? What has become easier and what harder? What asymmetric responses are possible for less technically advanced opponents?
- How does the information revolution (aka ‘net-centric warfare’) alter warfare? What has become easier and what harder? What asymmetric responses are possible for less technically advanced opponents?
- Looking forward, what kinds of political goals will become easier to achieve by force? What will become harder? How will the balance between offense and defense be affected?

Van Creveld, 235-49, 265-83.
Familiarize yourself with some modern U.S. missile systems, such as AIM-120 AMRAAM, AGM-88 HARM, AGM-114 Hellfire, AGM-136 TACIT RAINBOW, AGM-154 JSOW, and ATACMS. Note that basic laser-guided bombs still dominate the arsenal.
**“From Smart to Brilliant Weapons,” Business Week, October 8, 2001, 62.
*Seymour Hersh, “The Online Threat,” New Yorker, November 1, 2010, 44ff.

Also of interest (not assigned):
IV. New Adversaries, New Wars

20. Tues. November 19: Guerrilla War and Counterinsurgency [57]

- What makes insurgencies different from other types of wars? In who can fight them? In how to fight them? In who can win?
- How useful is the electronic revolution in waging counterinsurgencies?
- How are ideological and ethnic civil wars different? How do the differences matter for an outside power considering intervention?
- Why did the U.S. lose in Vietnam?
- How are we doing in Afghanistan?

*Chaim Kaufmann, “What Can We Do and What Can’t We? Counter-Insurgency in Ethnic vs. Ideological Civil Wars,” lecture at Sherman Kent School for Intelligence Analyses, November 15, 2006. Consider as notes on previous item.

Also of interest (not assigned):
Robert Taber, War of the Flea (Dulles, Va.: Potomac, 2002; originally 1965).
Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, FM 3-24: Counterinsurgency (December 15, 2006).
James Igoe Walsh, the Effectiveness of Drone Strikes in Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism Campaigns (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, September 2013).


- The readings and lecture for this class sessions all concern atrocities by U.S. troops. Why do you suppose I choose to focus on these cases?
- Under what circumstances do soldiers commit atrocities against civilians? Are atrocities rare or common?
- Should massacres by ground troops and avoidable killings of civilians from the air be considered equally evil?
- No Gun Ri is little known in relation to the scale of what happened. Was this case typical or special?
- Counterinsurgency operations always involve killings of noncombatants: some are accidental, some negligent, and some criminal. What can be done to reduce these?

**Apache Gunship Video” (July 12, 2007: released by wikileaks.org April 5, 2010). http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yo22QlP6NgQ. Note that there are three separate engagements whose legal or ethical statuses you might judge differently.

Also of interest (not assigned):
Bartov, Hitler’s Army, is relevant again here.

Human Rights Watch, A Face and a Name: Civilian Victims of Insurgent Groups in Iraq, October 3, 2005; also Getting Away with Torture? Command Responsibility for the U.S. Abuse of Detainees, April 24, 2005; and Report on 82nd Airborne Division, September 24, 2005.

Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff John Shalikashvili and 11 other generals and admirals, “Open Letter to the Senate Judiciary Committee,” January 4, 2005.


Haditha.


The schedule below this date is tentative; updates will be provided.

V. Into a New Century


• Since 1973 the U.S. has relied on an all-volunteer military, supplemented by ‘contractors’ in Iraq and Afghanistan. Is this a ‘mercenary’ army? Is that a problem?

• In the U.S. military, gays are no longer barred and most barriers to women serving in combat have fallen (women are still barred from Army and Marine infantry and armor units, though not from “combat support” such as artillery that can be equally dangerous). Will this trend toward inclusiveness continue? Is it good or bad for military effectiveness? For society more broadly?

• How was Kayla Williams’ experience similar to or different from those of men serving in Iraq?

• Can anything be done to reduce the risks that military women face from military men?


Also of interest (not assigned):
Peter D. Feaver, “The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control,” Armed Forces and Society 23:2 (Winter 1996), 149-78. The age-old question: how do you maintain a military force strong enough to win wars and yet retain control of it?


- Was it ever true that a rising great power and an established one were bound to become military rivals? If yes, has the nuclear revolution (or something else) now made that avoidable?
- If Chinese economic and military power increase far enough that the U.S. is no longer a global hegemon, how much of a problem is that? Why? What about a lesser degree of change in relative power?
- If the abilities of the U.S. Navy (and the other services) to project power overseas decline, either in absolute terms or relative to China, how much of a problem is that?
- Would the U.S. be better off trying to contain China in a manner broadly comparable to the Cold War; try to accommodate it, e.g., by giving up the commitment to Taiwan; or something else?
- To what extent do answers to all these questions depend how the U.S., or China, or both, will choose to define their identities or interests?

**“Dating Game: We Invite You to Predict When China Will Overtake America,” Economist, December 27, 2011. Play with the assumptions at http://www.economist.com/blogs/dailychart/2010/12/save_date.**


Also of interest (not assigned):


Avery Goldstein, “China’s Real and Present Danger,” *Foreign Affairs* 92:5 (September/October 2013), 136-44.

### 24. Thurs. December 5: Surveillance and the National Security State [46]

- Is the manner and scale of N.S.A. data collection a problem for Americans’ civil liberties?
- For rule of law?
- For checks and balances within the U.S. government?
- For American businesses?
- For U.S. relations with allies?
- Even if the costs are real, could the benefits be worth it?
- What should be done, and is there realistic prospect of doing it?


*Spencer Ackerman, “FISA Court Order that Allowed NSA Surveillance is Revealed for First Time,” *Guardian* (UK), November 19, 2013.

*Nicole Perlroth and John Markoff, “N.S.A. May Have Hit Internet Companies at a Weak Spot,” *New York Times*, November 26, 2013.


*Sisi Wei, Theodoric Meyer, and Justin Elliott, How the NSA’s Claim on Thwarted Terrorist Plots Has Spread” [interactive graphic], ProPublica, October 23, 2013. http://projects.propublica.org/graphics/nsa-54-cases
*Julian Borger, “Merkel Spying Claim: With Allies Like These, Who Needs Enemies?” Guardian (UK), October 23, 2013. Lots more like this, including third-party damage: on November 18 Indonesia recalled its ambassador to Australia.

25. Sat. December 7 (RCS): Counterinsurgency Simulation: MG 105, 1:10-3:00

*Kaufmann, IR 34 Iraq Patrol Simulation

Final Exam: December 18, 8:00-11:00 A.M., MG 102.